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CHAPTER 4 
Safeguarding of U.S. National Interests 
in the Maritime Environment 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
T his final chapter of Part I-Law of Peacetime Naval Operations-examines the broad principles of international law that 
govern the conduct of nations in protecting their interests at sea during time of 
peace. As noted in the priface, this publication provides general information. It is not 
directive, and does not supersede guidance issued by the commanders of the combatant 
commands, and in particular any guidance they may issue that delineates the circumstances 
and limitations under which the forces under their command will initiate and/or continue 
engagement with other forces encountered. 
Historically, international law governing the use offorce between natio{ls has 
been divided into rules applicable in peacetime and rules applicable in time of 
war.1 In recent years, however, the concepts of both "war" and "peace" have 
become blurred and no longer lend themselves to clear definition.2 
Consequendy, it is not always possible to try to draw neat distinctions between 
the two. Full scale hostilities continue to break out around the world, but few are 
accompanied by a formal declaration of war. 3 At the same time, the spectrum of 
anned conflict has widened and become increasingly complex.4 At one end of 
that spectrum is total nuclear war; at the other, insurgencies and state-sponsored 
terrorism.5 For the purposes of this publication, however, the conduct of anned 
1. 2 Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis 832 (Kelsey, transl. 1925). 
2. McDougal & Feliciano 7-9. 
3. A number of reasons have been advanced as to why nations conduct hostilities without a 
fonnal declaration of war: (1) a desire to avoid being branded as aggressors and later being 
compelled to pay reparations; (2) a desire to avoid triggering the sanctions and peace enforcement 
provisions of Chapters VI and VII of the U.N. Charter; (3) the "outlawry" of war by art. 2 of both 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact of1928 and the U.N. Charter of1945; (4) the post-World War II war 
crimes trials in Nuremberg and Tokyo; (5) the fear of embargo on war supplies under national 
legislation ofneurral countries; and (6) the fear held by an attacked weaker nation of widening 
localized hostilities. Stone 311. See also von Glahn, Law Among Nations 712-715 (6th ed. 1992); 
and paragraph 7.1 and note 6 (p. 366). 
4. Kidron & Smith, The War Atlas: Armed Conflict-Armed Peace (1983); McDougal & 
Feliciano 97-120. 
5. Terry, Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism: A Law-Policy Analysis, 36 Nav. L. Rev. 
159 (1986); Terry, An Appraisal ofLawful Military Response to State-Sponsored Terrorism, Nav. 
War ColI. Rev., May-June 1986, at59; Somer, Terrorism, The Law, and the National Defense, 
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hostilities involving U.S. forces, irrespective of character, intensity, or duration, 
is addressed in Part II-Law of Naval Warfare. 
4.1.1 Charter of the United Nations. Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter of 
the United Nations6 provides that: 
All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaciful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. 
Article 2, paragraph 4, provides that: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use ifforce against 
the territorial integrity or political independence if any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes if the United Nations.7 
In combination, these two provisions establish the fundamental principle of 
modem international law that nations will not use force or the threat of force to 
impose their will on other nations or to otherwise resolve their international 
differences. 
Under Chapter VI of the Charter, the Security Council has a number of 
measures short of the use of force available to it to facilitate the peaceful 
settlement of disputes. If, however, the dispute constitutes a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression, Article 39 of the Charter provides: 
The Security Council shall determine the existence if any threat to the peace, breach if the 
peace, or act if aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be 
5.( ... continued) 
126 Mil. L. Rev. 89 (1989); and Joyner, In Search of an Anti-Terrorism Policy: Lessons from the 
Reagan Era, 11 Terrorism 29 (1988). See also U.N.G.A. Res. A/49/60, Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism, 17 Feb. 1995, reprinted in 10 Terrorism/Documents ofInternational and 
Local Control (Levie ed. 1996) at 13. 
6. Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, as 
amended in 1963 (16 U.S.T. 1134, T.I.A.S. 5857),1965 (19U.S.T. 5450, T.I.A.S. 6529) and 1971 
(24 U.S.T. 2225, T.I.A.S. 7739) reprinted in AFP 110-20 at 5-2.1. As ofl November 1997, 186 
nations were members of the United Nations. The few nations not members of the United Nations 
include Kiribati, Nauru, Switzerland, Tonga, and Tuvalu. 
7. The purposes of the U.N. Charter are set forth in art. 1. They include: 
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for 
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring 
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations 
which might lead to a breach of the peace. 
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taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and 
. 8 
secuTtty. 
Such decisions of the Security Council are implemented under Article 41 or 
Article 42 of the Charter. Article 41 provides: 
The Security Council may deride what measures not involving the use if armed force are to be 
employed to give dfect to its derisions, and it may call upon the Members . .. to apply such 
measures. These may include complete or partial interruption if economic relations and if 
rail, sea, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means if communication, and the severance if 
diplomatic relations. 
8. The key provisions of the Charter relating to the role of the Security Council in the 
maintenance of international peace and security are as follows: 
CHAPTER V. TI,e Security Council 
Article 24 
1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members 
confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council 
acts on their behal£ ... 
Article 25 
The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council in accordance with the present Charter. 
Article 39 
CHAPTER VII. Aaion with Respea to 71Ireats to the Peace, 
Breadles if the Peace, and Acts if Aggression 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be 
taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. 
Article 41 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are 
to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United 
Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic 
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communications, and the 
severance of diplomatic relations. 
Article 42 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as 
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such.action may include 
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the 
United Nations. 
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8.( ... continued) 
Article 43 
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of 
international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and 
in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, anned forces, assistance, and facilities, 
including rights of passage, necessary for the prupose of maintaining international peace and security. 
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their 
degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be 
provided .... 
Article 45 
In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold 
immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement 
action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements 
referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff 
Committee. 
Article 46 
Plans for the application of anned force shall be made by the Security Council with the 
assistance of the Military Staff Committee. 
Article 47 
1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security 
Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the 
maintenance ofinternational peace and security, the employment and command offorces placed at 
its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament. 
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the ChiefS of Staff of the permanent 
members of the Security Council or their representatives .... 
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the 
strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council .... 
Article 48 
1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the 
maintenance ofinternational peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United 
Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine. 
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations direcdy and 
through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members. 
Article 49 
The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying 
out the measures decided upon by the Security Council. 
The members of the United Nations have not yet been able to conclude agreements in accordance 
with art. 43 and related Charter provisions. Instead, the United Nations, acting through the 
Secretary General, has from time to time requested members to voluntarily constitute emergency 
international U.N. peacekeeping forces as the need arose. In this way, the United Nations has sent 
peacekeeping forces to trouble spots around the world on 46 occasions. See Annex A4-1 (p. 267) 
for a current listing of all U.N. peacekeeping operations since 1947. See U.N., The Blue Helmets: 
A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping (1985); New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
United Nations Handbook (1991); and Fact Sheet: UN Peace-keeping Operations, U.S. Dep't of 
(continued ... ) 
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Article 42 provides that: 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or landforces 
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may 
include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of 
Members . ... 
These provisions do not, however, extinguish a nation's right of individual 
and collective self-defense. Article 51 of the Charter provides, that: 
Nothing in the . . . Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member . .. until the Securil)' Council has 
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security . ... 
8.( ... continued) 
State Dispatch, Sept. 30,1991, at 722. See also Bowett, United Nations Forces (1964); Boyd, 
United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: A Military and Political Appraisal (1971); Siekmann, 
Basic Documents on United Nations and Related Peace-Keeping Forces (1985), and Daniel & 
Hayes, Securing Observance of UN Mandates through the Employment of Military Forces, 
Strategic Research Department Report 3-95, Nav. War ColI. (1995); Daniel & Hayes, Beyond 
Traditional Peacekeeping (1995); Nordquist, What Color Helmet?: Refonning Security Council 
Peacekeeping Mandates, The Newport Papers, No. 12, U.S. Nav. War ColI. 1997. The U.N. 
Dep't of Peacekeeping maintains a useful website at WWW.UN.ORG/DEPTSIDPKO/. 
9. With the exception of the Korean War (see Stone at 228-37) and various peacekeeping 
activities (see note 8) armed forces have not been assigned to U.N. Command. Until August 1990, 
the veto power exercised by the permanent members of the Security Council prevented the 
Council from being able to carry out effectively, or in the manner contemplated by the framers of 
the Charter, its role in the maintenance of international peace and security. As a result, member 
nations have relied upon their inherent right of individual and collective self-defense to deter 
aggression and maintain international peace and security. The Security Council's authorization to 
use force to expel Iraq from Kuwait is recounted in Walker, The Crisis over Kuwait, August 
1990-February 1991, 1991 Duke J. Int'IL. 25; and Moore, Crisis in the Gulf(1992). Self-defense is 
discussed in paragraph 4.3.2 (p. 259). Nations continue to act in their own self-interest in a 
horizontally structured world in which sovereignty plays an extremely important role. 
Accordingly, recourse to individual and collective self-defense, as reflected in art. 51 of the 
Charter, has become the norm. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, in testifYing before the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the Mutual Defense Treaty with Korea (Hearings, 
83d Cong., 2d Sess., 13 Jan. 1954, at 21), explained: "All of the security treaties which we have 
made have been conceived ofas filling under Article 51." The full text of that art. provides: 
Article 51 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right ofindividual or collective 
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures 
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of s6lf-defense shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security 
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. 
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The following paragraphs discuss some of the measures that nations, acting in 
conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, may take in pursuing and 
protecting their national interests during peacetime. 
4.2 NONMILITARY MEASURES 
4.2.1 Diplomatic. As contemplated by the United Nations Charter, nations 
generally rely on peaceful means to resolve their differences and to protect their 
9.( ... continued) 
Secretary Dulles testified further that: 
[I]n the main, the arrangement that we have made has been under article 51, which is 
one of broad and not necessarily regional scope, because the article which deals with 
regional associations [article 53], as such, has a provision that no forcible action shall 
be taken under thos regional agreements except with the consent of the Security 
Council, and in view of the Soviet vto powr in the Security Council, it would result, 
if you operated direcdy nder that regional-pact clause, you would not have the right 
to resort to force or use force except with the consent of the Soviet Union. 
"Regional arrangements" are specifically addressed in articles 52 and 53 of the Charter: 
Article 52 
1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or 
agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and 
security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and 
their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations .... 
Article 53 
1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or 
agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken 
under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security 
CounciL ... 
Secretary of State Rusk testified before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee on 25 August 
1966: 
The United Nations has not been able to deal effectively with all threats to the peace, 
nor will it be able to do so as long as certain of its members believe they must 
continue to compromise between their professed desire for peace and their short 
range interest in achieving greater power or place in the world .... It was recognized 
from the outset, however, that the United Nations might not prove able by itself to 
carry the full burden of collective security. The Charter explicidy provides for the 
existence of regional organizations, such as the Organization of American States, 
which would deal with problems of international peace and security in their 
respective areas. It also explicidy recognizes the inherent right of both individual and 
collective self-defense. 
Consistendy with the United Nations Charter, we [the United States] have entered 
into multilateral and bilateral treaty arrangements with more than 40 countries on 5 
continents. 
(continued ... ) 
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interests. Diplomatic measures include all those political actions taken by one 
nation to influence the behavior of other nations within the framework of 
international law. They may involve negotiation, conciliation or mediation, and 
may be cooperative or coercive (e.g., severing of diplomatic relations).10 The 
behavior of an offending nation may be curbed by appeals to world public 
opinion as in the General Assembly, or, if their misconduct endangers the 
maintenance of international peace and security, by bringing the issue before the 
Security Council. Ordinarily, however, differences that arise between nations 
are resolved or accommodated through the normal day-to-day, give-and-take of 
international diplomacy. The key point is that disputes between the U.S. and 
other nations arising out of conflicting interests are normally addressed and 
resolved through diplomatic channels and do not involve resort to the threat or 
use of force. 11 
9.( ... continued) 
Quoted in U.S. Congo House Foreign Affairs Comm., Collective Defense Treaties, with maps, 
Text of Treaties, A Chronology, Status of Forces Agreements, and Comparative Charts, 91st 
Cong., 1st Sess., 15-17 (Comm. Print 1969). 
The United States has entered into several mutual defense treaties that are currendy in force. The 
NATO and Rio Treaties provide that an attack on one member nation is an attack on all and each 
will assist in meeting the attack. The ANZUS, Philippine, Japanese, Korean, and SEATO Treaties 
provide that an armed attack on any party would endanger its own peace and safety and that each 
party will act to meet the common danger "in accordance with its constitutional processes." 
10. 2 Restatement (Third), sec. 905, Comments & Reporters' Notes. 
11. Under the U.S. Constitution, the President is responsible for the conduct of U.S. foreign 
policy. In overseas areas, the President principally exercises that responsibility through the chief 
U.S. diplomatic and consular representative to the country concerned, also known as the chief of 
mission. The chief of mission is required, under the direction of the president, to exercise "full 
responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government employees in that 
country (except for employees under the command of a United States area military commander)," 
to keep fully and currendy informed with respect to "all activities and operations of the 
Government within that country," and to ensure that all government employees in that country 
(except for employees under the command of aU .S. area military commander) "comply fully with 
all applicable directives of the chief of mission." Further, any U.S. government agency having 
employees in a foreign country is required to "keep the chief of mission to that country fully and 
currendy informed with respect to all activities and operations ofits employees in that country," 
and to "insure that all of its employees (except for employees under the command of a United 
States area military commander) comply fully with all applicable directives of the chief of mission." 
22 U .S.C. sec. 3927 (1994). This requirement is included in each presidential letter ofinstruction 
to chiefS of mission. That letter currendy (1994) includes the following: 
As Commander in Chief, I retain authority over United States Armed Forces. On 
my behalf you have responsiblity for the direction, coordination, supervision, and 
safety, including secruity from terrorism, of all Defense Department personnel on 
official duty [in (country)/at (international organization)], except those personnel 
under the command of aU .S. area military commander. You and such commanders 
must keep each other currendy informed and cooperate on all matters of mutual 
interest. Any differences that cannot be resolved in the field should be reported by 
(continued ... ) 
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4.2.2 Economic. Nations often utilize economic measures to influence the 
actions of others. The granting or withholding of "most favored nation" status to 
another country is an often used measure of economic policy. Similarly, trade 
agreements, loans, concessionary credit arrangements and other aid, and 
investment opportunity are among the many economic measures that nations 
extend, or may withhold, as their national interests dictate.12 Examples of the 
coercive use of economic measures to curb or otherwise seek to influence the 
conduct of other nations include the suspension of u.S. grain sales and the 
embargo on the transfer of U.S. technology to the offendin§ nation, 13 boycott of 
oil and other export products from the offending nation, 1 suspension of "most 
r: d ." d h . f h .. 15 Iavore nanon status, an t e assertlon 0 ot er econonuc sancnons. 
11. ( ... continued) 
to the Secretary of State; area military conunanders should report to the Secretary of 
Defense. 
An extended version of President Clinton's letter of instruction to chiefS of mission is at Annex A4-2 
(p. 256). Under 10 U.S.c. sec. 162(a)(4) (1994) "[e]xcept as otherwise directed by the Secretary of 
Defense, all forces operating within the geographic area assigned to a unified combatant command 
shall be assigned to, and under the command of, the commander of that command." 
These requirements are implemented for deployed naval forces in U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990. 
Art. 0911 provides that the senior officer present in a deployed naval force, insofar as possible, shall 
preserve close relations with the diplomatic and consular representatives of the United States. Art. 
0912 also provides that in the absence of a diplomatic or consular representatives of the United 
States, the senior officer present in a foreign country has authority, among other things, to 
communicate or remonstrate with foreign civil authorities as may be necessary. Further, art. 0914 
provides that "[O]n occasions when injury to the United States or to citizens thereofis committed 
or threatened in violation of the principles of international law or in violation of rights existing 
under a treaty or other international agteement, the senior officer present shall consult with the 
diplomatic or consular representatives of the United States, ifpossible, and shall take such action as 
is demanded by the gravity of the situation." See paragraph 4.3.2.2 and accompany notes (p. 263) 
for a discussion of actions to be taken by U.S. military conunanders in such circumstances. 
On the matter of requests for asylum, see paragraph 3.3 (p. 216). 
12. See 12 Whiteman 311-21, 2 Restatement (Third), sec. 905 Comment fat 382, and 
Reporters' Note 8, at 300-01 for discussions of retorsion (unfriendly but lawful acts not involving 
the use of force in response to objectionable acts of another nation), retaliation and reprisal. 
13. The United States took these actions, among others, in its initial response to the December 
25, 1979, invasion of Mghanistan by the Soviet Union. Presidential Address to the Nation, 4 
January 1980, Dep't St. Bull., Jan. 1980, at B. This embargo was lifted in April 1981. Dep't St. 
Bull., Oct. 1982, at 42. Similar actions were taken by the United States in December 1981, in 
response to Soviet-inspired repression in Poland. Dep't St. Bull., Feb. 1982, at 8. 
14. The United States took these actions against Libya in response to the continuing pattern of 
Libyan activity to promote instability and terrorism which violates accepted international norms of 
behavior. Exec. Order No. 12,538,3 C.F.R. 395-96 (1986); Proclamation No. 5141, 3 C.F.R. 
143-44 (1984); Proclamation No. 4907, 3 C.F.R. 21-22 (1983) (these presidential documents are 
reprinted in 19 U.S.C. sec. 1862 note (Supp. III 1985). 
15. The United States took such actions against Nicaragua on 1 May 1985, Dep't St. Bull.,July 
1985, at 74-75, underthe International Emergency Economic Powers Act of1977, 50 U.S. C. sec. 
(continued ... ) 
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4.2.3 Judicial. Nations may also seek judicial resolution of their peacetime 
disputes, both in national courts and before international tribunals. A nation or 
its citizens may bring a legal action against another nation in its own national 
courts, provided the court has jurisdiction over the matter in controversy (such 
as where the action is directed against property of the foreign nation located 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court) and provided the foreign nation 
does not interpose a valid claim of sovereign immunity. Similarly, a nation or its 
citizens may bring a legal action against another nation in the latter's courts, or in 
the courts of a third nation, Rrovided jurisdiction can be found and sovereign 
. .. . d 16 Immuruty IS not mterpose . 
Nations may also submit their disputes to the International Court of Justice for 
resolution. Article 92 of the United Nations Charter establishes the International 
Court of Justice as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. No nation 
may bring another before the Court unless the latter nation first consents. That 
consent can be general and given beforehand or can be given in regard to a 
specific controversy. Nations also have the option of submitting their disputes to 
ad hoc or other established tribunals.17 
4.3 MILITARY MEASURES 
The mission ofU .S. military forces is to deter armed attack against the United 
States across the range of military operations, defeat an armed attack should 
deterrence fail, and prevent or neutralize hostile efforts to intimidate or coerce 
the United States by the threat or use of armed force or terrorist actions.18 In 
15.( ... continued} 
1701 et seq. (1982) and other statutory authority. See also Terry, The Iranian Hostages Crisis: 
International Law and United States Policy, 32 JAG J. 31, 53-56 (1982). The United States' 
unilateral economic reaction to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 involved the freezing 
of Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets by Executive Orders 12722-23, 3 C.F.R. 294-96 (1991). More 
recendy, sanctions have been imposed on Cuba (see. e.g. 22 U.S.C. sec. 6005 (1996)} and Bosnia 
(see U.N.S.C. Res. 757 (30 May 1992)}. 
16. On sovereign immunity see DA Pam 27-161-1, at chap. 5; Franck & Glennon, Foreign 
Relations and National Security Law: Cases, Materials and Simulations 214-26 (1987); Brownlie, 
Principles of Public International Law 322-45 (4th ed. 1990). The United States has waived its 
sovereign immunity in certain types of cases. See, e.g., the Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. sec. 781 et 
seq., the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. sec. 741 et seq., and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 
U.S.C. sec. 2671 et seq. The United States respects assertions of sovereign immunity by foreign 
sovereigns. Foreign Immunities Act of1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. secs. 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, 1602 et seq. (1994)}. 
17. Fora comprehensive analysis of the International Court of Justice and a discussion of major 
cases brought before it, see Rosenne, The World Court: What it is and how it works (5th ed. 1995). 
See also paragraph 10.2.1, note 1 (p. 10-1) fora discussion of the I.CJ. 8July 1996 Advisory Opinion 
on the Legality of the T1Ireat or Use of Nudear Weapons. 
18. See National Security Strategy of the United States, "A National Security of Engagement 
and Enlargement" The White House, Feburary 1995, at 1-12. 
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order to deter armed attack, U.S. military forces must be both capable and ready, 
and must be perceived to be so by potential aggressors. Equally important is the 
perception of other nations that, should the need arise, the U.S. has the will to 
use its forces in individual or collective self-defense. 19 
4.3.1 Naval Presence. U.S. naval forces constitute a key and unique element of 
our national military capability. The mobility of forces operating at sea 
combined with the versatility of naval force composition-from units operating 
individually: to multi-battle group formations-provide the National Command 
Authorities20 with the flexibility to tailor U.S. military presence as circumstances 
may reqUlre. 
Naval presence, whether as a showing of the flag during port visits or as forces 
deployed in response to contingencies or crises, can be tailored to exert the 
precise influence best suited to U.S. interests. Depending upon the magnitude 
and immediacy of the problem, naval forces may be positioned near areas of 
potential discord as a show of force or as a symbolic expression of support and 
concern. Unlike land-based forces, naval forces may be so employed without 
political entanglement and without the necessity of seeking littoral nation 
consent. So long as they remain in international waters and international 
airspace, U.S. warships and military aircraft enjoy the full spectrum of the high 
seas freedoms of navigation and overflight, including the right to conduct naval 
maneuvers, subject only to the requirement to observe international standards of 
safety, to recognize the rights of other ships and aircraft that may be encountered, 
and to issue NOTAMs and NOTMARs21 as the circumstances may require. 
Deployment of a carrier battle group into the vicinity of areas of tension and 
augmentation of U.S. naval forces to deter interference with U.s. commercial 
shipping in an area of armed conflict provide graphic illustrations of the use of 
U.S. naval forces in peacetime to deter violations of international law and to 
protect U.S. flag shipping.22 
19. See National Military Strategy; "A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement," the 
Pentagon, 1995 at 8-16. 
20. The tenn "National Command Authorities" is defined as "The President and the Secretary 
of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Commonly referred to as NCA." Joint 
Pub. 1-02. 
21. The tenn "National Command Authorities" is defined as "The President and the Secretary 
of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Commonly referred to as NCA." Joint 
Pub. 1-02. 
22. U.S. Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, "Naval Warfare" (1994) at 20-1; Watkins, The 
Maritime Strategy, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc. Supp.,Jan. 1986, at 7-8; Neutze, Bluejacket Diplomacy: 
AJuridical Examination of Naval Forces in Support of United States Foreign Policy, 32 JAG J. 81, 
83 (1982). 
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4.3.2 The Right of Self-Defense. The Charter of the United Nations 
recognizes that all nations enjoy the inherent23 right of individual and collective 
self-defense24 against armed attack.25 U.S. doctrine on self-defense, set forth in 
the JCS Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces, provides that the use of 
force in self-defense against armed attack, or the threat of imminent armed 
attack, rests upon two elements: 
1. Necessity-The requirement that a use offorce be in response to a hostile act or 
d . fh til· 26 emonstratIon 0 os e mtent. 
2. Proportionality-The requirement that the use offorce be in all circwnstances limited 
in intensity, duration, and scope to that which is reasonably required to counter the 
attlCk or threat of attack and to ensure the continued safety of u.s. forces?7 
Customary intemationallaw has long recognized that there are circumstances 
during time of peace when nations must resort to the use of armed force to 
protect their national interests against unlawful or otherwise hostile actions by 
23. The "inherent" right of self-defense refers to the right of self-defense as it existed in 
customary international law when the UN Charter was written. See Brierly, The Law of Nations 
416-21 (6th ed. 1963); Stone, at 244; von Glahn, Law Among Nations 129-33 (6th ed. 1992); 
Harlow, The Legal Use of Force ... Short of War, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., Nov. 1966, at 89; 
Fairley, State Actors, Humanitarian Intervention and International Law: Reopening Pandora's 
Box, 10 Ga.]. Int'l & Compo L. 29 (1980); Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law (1958). 
Compare Randelzhofer, Article 51, in The Charter of the United Nations, A Commentary 
661-78 (Simma ed. 1994). 
24. See 2 Restatement (Third), sec. 905. Collective self-defense is considered in paragtaph 
7.2.2 (p. 370). 
25. While the literal EngIish language of art . 51 limits self-defense to cases where "armed attack 
occurs," State practice such as in the case of the 1962 Cuban Quarantine (see paragtaph 4.3.2, note 
31 (p. 262» has generally recognized that "armed aggression" rather than "armed attack" justifies 
the resort to self-defense; this position is supported by the equally authentic French text of art. 51: 
"agcession armee." See Brierly and Randelzhofer, both at note 23. Anticipatory self-defense is 
discussed in paragtaph 4.3.2.1 (p. 263). See also Dinstein, War, Aggcession and Self-Defense 
187-91 (2d ed. 1994). 
26. See SROE, para. 5d at Annex A4-3 (p. 277). 2 Restatement (Third), sec. 905(1)(a) & 
Comment 3, at 387. 
27. See SROE, para. 5d at Annex A4-3 (p. 277). 2 Restatement (Third), sec. 905(1)(b) & 
Reporters' Note 3, at 388-89. See also Randelzhofer at 667 for a discussion of the principle of 
proportionality (note 23). U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990, art. 0915, addressing the legality of resort 
to the use of force against a foreign nation, reflects these principles: 
1. The use of force in time of peace by United States naval personnel against another 
nation or against anyone within the territories thereof is illegal except as an act of self-defense. 
Naval personnel have a right of self-defense against hostile acts and hostile intent (imminent threat 
to use force). This right includes defending themselves, their subunits and, when appropriate, 
defending U.S. citizens, their property and U.S. commercial assets in the vicinity. 
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other nations.28 A number of legal concepts have evolved over the years to 
sanction the limited use of armed forces in such circumstances (e.g., 
. . 29 b 30 . . . ) T h h h mterventlon, em argo, mantlme quarantlne. 0 t e extent t at suc 
27.( ... continued) 
2. The conditions calling for the application of the right of self-defense cannot be precisely 
defined beforehand, but must be left to the sound judgment of responsible naval personnel who are 
to perform their duties in this respect with all possible cate and forbearance. The use offorce must 
be exercised only as a last resort, and then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to 
accomplish the end required. 
3. Force must never be used with a view to inflicting unlawful punishment for acts already 
committed. 
28. See Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 Am. J. Infl L. 259 (1989); Ronzitti, 
Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and Intervention on Grounds of 
Humanity (1985). 
29. While difficult to define precisely, intervention is generally recognized in international law 
as at least including the use offorce which results in the interference by one nation in matters under 
the exclusive jurisdiction of another nation, for instance, interference in its domestic or foreign 
affairs. It is also sometimes referred to as interference with the sovereignty of another nation. 
Intervention frequently involves the nonperrnissive entry into the territory of another nation. Any 
action constituting substantial interference with or hatasSment of a foreign private or public vessel 
on the high seas may be considered as an impairment of the foreign nation's sovereignty. 
Every nation has the obligation under international law to respect the sovereignty of every other 
nation. A violation of that sovereignty by intervention is therefore a violation of international law 
unless justified by a specific rule to the contrary, such as the rights of self-defense and of 
humanitarian intervention to prevent a nation from committing atrocities against its own subjects 
which is itself a violation of international law. There has been, however, considerable 
disagreement over this latter rationale. 
Intervention may be accomplished either with or without the use of force. Self-defense against 
atffied attack or the threat of imminent attack is generally a necessary prerequisite for atffied 
intervention. Intervention is justified under the following circumstances, which ate not all inclusive: 
1. To protect nations that request intervention in the face of an external threat and 
in certain other special cases. The intervention by the UnitedStates in the 
Dominican Republic in 1965 is illustrative of this circumstance. 
2. In response to a request from the government of one nation for assistance in 
repelling threatened or attempted subversion directed by another nation. Examples of 
this circumstance include the U.S. and British actions in Lebanon (1958) andJordan 
(1957-58), and the U.S. actions in Vietnam (1963-75) and El Slavador (1981-86). 
3. A serious danger to the territory of a nation may arise either as a result of a natural 
catastrophe in another nation or as a result of the other nation deliberately or 
negligently employing its natural resources to the detriment of the first nation. For 
example, the reservoirs of Nation A on the upper reaches of a river might be 
damaged by natural forces, posing a threat to Nation B on the lower reaches. 
Intervention by the threatened nation (Nation B) is justified if the other nation 
(Nation A) is unwilling or unable to provide a timely and effective remedy. The 
U.N. Security Council should be immediately advised of the intervention (art. 51). 
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29.( ... continued) 
4. To protect the lives and property of a nation's citizens abroad, particularly its 
diplomatic personnel. State practice has tolerated the use of force to protect a 
nation's citizens outside its borders if the individuals were in imminent danger of 
irreparable harm and the nation in whose territory the individuals were located 
could not or would not protect them. The 1976 Israeli raid at Entebbe Airport, the 
1977 West German raid at Mogadishu, Somalia, the 1980 U.S. Iranian hostage 
rescue attempt, the 1983 U.S. intervention in Grenada and the 1988 U.S. 
intervention in Panama are examples of self-defense being asserted on behalf of one 
nation's citizens in the territory of another. 
5. In response to genocide or other compelling humanitarian circumstance. This 
evolving concept ofhumanitarian intervention has not yet attained general acceptance. 
See 1976 Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law 3-11; 2 Restatement (Third), sec. 905 
Comment g, at 383; Ronzitti, Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and 
Intervention on Grounds of Humanity (1985); Dean, Self-Determination and U.S. Support of 
Insurgents, A Policy-Analysis Model, 122 Mil. L. Rev. 149 (1988); Akehurst, Humanitarian 
Intervention, in Intervention in World Politics 95 (Bull ed. 1984); and Teson, Humanitarian 
Intervention (1995). 
The Entebbe raid is discussed in Contemporary Practice of the U.S., 73 Am.]. Int'l L 122 (1979); 
Salter, Commando Coup atEntebbe: Humanitarian Intervention or Barbaric Aggcession?, 11 Int'l 
Lawyer 331 (1977); Boyle, International Law in Time of Crisis: From the Entebbe Raid to the 
Hostages Convention, 75 Nw. U.L. Rev. 769 (1980); Boyle, The Entebbe Hostages Crisis, 29 
Neth. Int'l L. Rev. 32 (1982). See also Green, Rescue at Entebbe-Legal Aspects, 6 Isr. Y.B. 
Human Rights 312 (1976) and Ben-Porat, Haber & Schiff, Entebbe Rescue (1977). 
The Iranian hostage rescue attempt is described in 78 Am.]. Int'l L. 200 (1984); U.N. Doc. 
S/13908, 25 Aprll1980;JCS Special Operations Review Group, Rescue Mission Report, August 
1990, reprinted in Aviation Week & Space Technology, 15 Sep. 1980, at 61-71,22 Sep. 1980, at 
140-44,29 Sep. 1980, at 84-91; Carter, Keeping Faith 506-22 (1982); Brzezinski, Power and 
Principle 487-500 (1985); Beckwith & Know, Delta Force (1983); Ryan, The Iranian Rescue 
Mission: Why It Failed (1985); Kyle, The Guts to Try (1990); Terry, The Iranian Hostages: 
International Law and United States Policy, 32 JAG J. 31 (1982); and Green, The Tehran Embassy 
Incident-Legal Aspects, 19 Archlv des Volkerrechts 1 (1980). 
On United States intervention in El Salvador/Nicaragua in the 1980s, see Joyner & Grimaldi, The 
United States and Nicaragua: Reflections on the Lawfulness of Contemporary Intervention, 25 
Va.J. Int'IL. 621 (1985); and Moore, The Secret War in Central America and the Future ofWorld 
Order, 80 Am.]. Int'l L. 43-127 (1986). 
The October 1983 Grenada operation is described in O'Shaughnessy, Grenada: Revolution, 
Invasion and Aftermath (1984); The Grenada Papers-(Seabury & McDougall, eds. 1984); 
American Intervention in Grenada: The Implication of Operation Urgent Fury (Dunn & Watson 
eds. 1985); Spector, U.S. Marines in Grenada (1987); Lehman, Command of the Seas 291-305 
(1988); Adkin, Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada (1989); Weinberger, Fighting for Peace 
101-33 (1990); Musicant, The Banana Wars 370-89 (1990); Leich, Current Practice of the United 
States Relating to International Law: Rescue Operation by Armed Forces-Grenada, 78 Am.]. 
Int'l L. 200-04 (1984); U.N. Doc. S/16076, 25 October 1983; The United States Action in 
Grenada, 78 Am.]. Int'l L. 131-75 (1984); Moore, Law and the Grenada Mission (1984); Maizel, 
Intervention in Grenada, 35 JAG]. 47 (1986); and Beck, The "McNeil Mission" and the Decision 
to Invade Grenada, Nav. War ColI. Rev., Spring 1991, at 93. 
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concepts have continuing validity under the Charter of the United Nations, they 
are premised on the broader principle of self-defense. 
The concept of maritime quarantine provides a case in point. Maritime 
quarantine was first invoked by the United States as a means of interdicting the 
flow of Soviet strategic missiles into Cuba in 1962. That action involved a 
limited coercive measure on the high seas applicable only to ships carrying 
offensive weaponry to Cuba and utilized the least possible military force to 
achieve that purpose. That action, formally ratified by the Organization of 
American States (OAS), has been widely approved as a legitimate exercise of the 
inherent right of individual and collective self-defense recognized in Article 51 
of the UN Charter.31 
29.( ... continued) 
The December 1989 U.S. intervention in Panama is described in Musicant, The Banana Wars 
390-417 (1990); Briggs, Operation Just Cause: Panama December 1989: A Soldier's Eyewitness 
Account (1990); Woodward, The Commanders 83-195 (1991); Donnelly, Roth & Baker, 
OperationJust Cause: The Storming ofPanama (1991); McConnell,Just Cause: The Real Story of 
America's High-Tech Invasion of Panama (1991); Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story (1992). 
OperationJust Cause is analyzed in Parkerson, United States Compliance with Humanitarian Law 
Respecting Civilians During Operation Just Cause, 133 Mil. L. Rev. 31 (1991); and Terry, The 
Panamanian Intervention: Law in Support of Policy, 39 Nav. L. Rev. 5 (1990). 
On Operation Provide Comfort, relief to Iraqi Kurds in March 1991, see U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 688 (1991). 
30. In practice, the concepts of embargo and boycott have become blurred and have taken on a 
broader meaning. The terms now include preventing the import, export, movement or other 
dealing in goods, services or financial transactions to exert pressure on an offending nation. An 
embargo or boycott may be used, for example, to preclude an alleged aggressor nation from 
increasing its war-making potential, or to prevent the aggravation of civil strife in a nation in which 
it may be occurring. See 12 Whiteman 344-49. The maritime interception operations and air 
embargo enforced against Iraq as a consequence ofits invasion of Kuwait, on 2 August 1990, are 
summarized in Walker, The Crisis over Kuwait, August 1990-February 1991, 1991 Duke]. 
Compo & Int'l L. 25, 34-36. See also Joyner, Sanctions, Compliance and International Law: 
Reflections on the United Nations' Experience Against Iraq, 32 Va.]. Int'l L. 1 (1991); and 
Almond, An Assessment of Economic Warfare: Developments from the Persian Gulf, 31 Va.]. 
Int'l L. 645 (1991). 
31. At the time, the U.S. Government characterized the quarantine as a sanction imposed by 
collective agreement pursuant to art. 52 of the U.N. Charter, and did not rely on self-defense to 
justifY its actions. Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis: International Crises and the Role of Law 
(1974); Robertson, Blockade to Quarantine,JAG ]"June 1963, at 87; McDevitt, The UN Charter 
and the Cuban Quarantine, JAG J., April-May 1963, at 71; McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban 
Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 Am. ]. Int'l L. 597 (1963); Christol & Davis, Maritime 
Quarantine: The Naval Interdiction of Offensive Weapons and Associated Material to Cuba, 
1962, 57 Am. ]. Int'l L. 525; Mallison, Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine-Interdiction: 
National and Collective Defense Claims Valid Under International Law, 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
335 (1962). 
The 1990-91 maritime interception operations in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea by 
Coalition Forces to prevent Iraqi imports and exports were conducted pursuant to U.N. Security 
Council Resolutions 661 and 665 and art. 51 of the U.N. Charter. They are described in Carter, 
Blockade, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., Nov. 1990, at 42; and Delery, Away, the Boarding Party!, U.S. 
Nav. Inst. Proc.lNaval Review, May 1991, at 65. 
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4.3.2.1 Anticipatory Self-Defense. Included within the inherent right of 
self-defense is the right of a nation (and its anned forces) to protect itself from 
imminent attack. International law recognizes that it would be contrary to the 
purposes of the United Nations Charter if a threatened nation were required to 
absorb an aggressor's initial and potentially crippling first strike before taking 
those military measures necessary to thwart an imminent attack. Anticipatory 
self-defense involves the use of anned force where attack is imminent and no 
reasonable choice of peaceful means is available. 32 
4.3.2.2 JCS Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE). The JCS Standing 
Rules of Engagement establish fundamental policies and procedures governing 
the actions to be taken by U.s. commanders during military operations, 
contingencies, or prolonged conflicts. (See also the discussion of SROE in the 
Preface.) At the national level, rules of engagement are promulgated by the 
NCA, through the Chairman of the Joint ChiefS of Staff, to the combatant 
commanders to guide them in the employment of their forces toward the 
achievement of broad national objectives.33 At the tactical level, rules of 
32. This is a departure from the treatment of this issue in NWP-9 (Rev. A) which stated: 
Anticipatory self-defense involves the use of armed force where there is a clear 
necessity that is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no reasonable choice of peaceful 
means. [Emphasis added.] 
That statement derives from U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster's 1841 articulation of the right 
to resort to self-defense as emanating from circumstances when the necessity for action is "instant, 
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." See TIle Caroline 
Case, 2 Moore 409-14, discussed in Bunn, International Law and the Use of Force in Peacetime: Do 
U.S. Ships Have to Take the First Hit?, Nav. War ColI. Rev., May-June 1986, at70; and Jennings, 
TIle Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 Am. J. Int'l L. 82 (1938). The Webster formUlation is clearly too 
restrictive today, particularly given the nature and lethality of modem weapons systems which may 
be employed with little, if any, warning. Ascertaining when a modem weapons system's 
employment may be "instant" or "overwhelming" is at best problematical. Moreover, as noted by 
the Mallisons, "a credible threat may be imminent without being 'instant' and more than a 
'moment for deliberation' is required to make a lawful choice of means." See Mallison & Mallison, 
Naval Targeting: Lawful Objects of Attack, in Robertson at 263. McDougal and Feliciano, in 
commenting on this issue, stated "the standard of required necessity has been habitually cast in 
language so abstractly restrictive as almost, if read literally, to impose paralysis. Such is the clear 
import of the classical peroration of Secretary of State Webster in TIle Caroline case .... [T]he 
requirements of necessity and proportionality ... can ultimately be subjected only to that most 
comprehensive and fundamental test of all law , reasonableness in particular context." McDougal & 
Feliciano 217-18. See also, Jessup, A Modem Law of Nations 163-64 (1948); Sofaer, Terrorism, 
The Law, and the National Defense, 126 Mil. L. Rev. 89 (1989); Joyner, The Rabta Chemical 
Factory Fire: Rethinking the Lawfulness of Anticipatory Self-Defense, 13 Terrorism 79 (1990); 
Dinstein, paragraph 4.3.2, note 25 (p. 259); and Lowe, The Commander's Handbook on the Law 
of Naval Operations and the Contemporary Law of the Sea, in Robertson at 127-30. 
33. Self-defense, in relation to the United States as a nation, is the act of defending the United 
States and U.S. forces from attack or threat of imminent attack. See AnnexA4-3, para. 5b (p. 281). 
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engagement are task and mission-oriented. At all levels, u.s. rules of 
engagement are consistent with the law of armed conflict.34 Because rules of 
engagement also reflect operational and national policy factors, they often 
restrict combat operations far more than do the requirements of international 
law. A full range of options is reserved to the National Command Authorities to 
determine the response that will be made to hostile acts and demonstrations of 
33.( ... continued) 
This concept relates to regional or global situations possibly preceding prolonged engagements and 
related to unstable international relations. The concept of self-defense is also invoked in 
confrontations between U.S. forces and foreign forces who are involved in an international anned 
conflict both where the United States remains neutral or is otherwise not a party to the conflict and 
where the United States is a party to the conflict. For a more detailed discussion of neutrality and its 
impact on naval operations, see Chapter 7. U.S. forces exercised national self-defense in response to 
Libya's attacks on U.S. forces in the Gulf of Sidra on 24-25 March 1986, and to Libya's support for 
international terrorism in the attacks on Tripoli and Benghazi on 14 April 1986. U.S. Letter to 
U.N. Security Council, 25 March 1986, U.N. Doc. S/17938, reprinted in Dep't St. Bull., May 
1986, at 80; Presidential Letters to Congress, 26 March 1986, 22 Weekly Compo Pres. Doc. 423; 
Presidential Letters to Congress, 16 April 1986, reprinted in Dep't St. Bull., June 1986, at 8; U.S. 
Letterto U.N. Security Council, 14 April 1986, U.N. Doc. S/17990. See also 80 Am.]. Int'lL. 632 
(1986); Lehman, Command of the Seas 357-76 (1988); Weinberger, Fighting for Peace 175-201 
(1990); Warriner, The Unilateral Use of Coercion Under International Law: A Legal Analysis of 
the United States Raid on Libya on April 14, 1986,37 Nav. L. Rev. 49 (1988). 
Documentation regarding the shooting down ofIran Air Flight 655 on 4 July 1988 is reproduced in 
28 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 896 (1989); 83 Am.]. Int'l332 (1989), and discussed in Friedman, The Vincennes 
Incident, U.S. Nav. Inst. Proc.lNaval Review, May 1989, at 72, and Hearings before the Defense 
Policy Panel of the House Anned Service Committee, 9 Sep. 1988. See also Linman, Iran Air 655 
and Beyond: Free Passage, Mistaken Self-Defense, and State Responsibility, 16 Yale]. Int'l L. 245 
(1991). 
34. Self-defense, in relation to a unit of U.S. naval forces, is the act of defending from attack or 
threat of imminent attack that unit (including elements thereof) and other U.S. forces in the 
vicinity, or U.S. citizens or U.S. flag vessels or other U.S. commercial assets in the vicinity of that 
unit. See Annex A4-3, para. 5c (p. 281). Generally, this concept relates to localized, low-level 
situations that are not preliminary to prolonged engagements. The response of two U.S. Navy 
F-14 aircraft to the attack by two Libyan Su-22 aircraft over the Gulf of Sidra on 14 August 1981 
was an exercise of unit self-defense against a hostile force that had committed a hostile act and posed 
a continuing threat of immediate attack. U.N. Doc. S/17938, 25 March 1986; Neutze, The Gulf 
of Sidra Incident: A Legal Prespective, U.S. Nav. Inst. Proc.,Jan 1982, at 26; Parks, Crossing the 
Line, U.S. Nav. Inst. Proc., Nov. 1986, at 40 & 43; Rather, The Gulf of Sidra Incident of1981: A 
Study of the Lawfulness of Peacetime Aerial Engagements, 7 Yale J. Int'l L. 59 (1984). Similarly, 
the shootdown of two Libyan MiG-23s on 4 January 1989 by two F-14s over international waters 
of the Mediteranean Sea more than 40 miles off the eastern coast of Libya, after the MiGs 
repeatedly turned toward them and did not break off the intercept, was an act of unit self-defense 
against units demonstrating hostile intent. U.N. Doc. S/20366, 4 January 1989. 
35. Grunawalt, The JCS Standing Rules of Engagement: A Judge Advocate's Primer, 42 Air 
Force L. Rev. 245 (1997); Roach, Rules of Engagement, Nav. WarColl. Rev.,Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 
46-53, reprinted in 14 Syr.]. Int'l L. & Com. 865 (1988); and Hayes, Naval Rules ofEngagement: 
(continued ... ) 
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hostile intent. The SROE provide implementation guidance on the inherent 
right and obligation of self-defense and the application of force for mission 
accomplishment.35 A principal tenet of these ROE is the commander's inherent 
authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all 
appropriate action in self-defense of the commander's unit and other U.S. forces 
. h ... 36 
In t e Vlclmty. 
4.4 INTERCEPTION OF INTRUDING AIRCRAFT 
All nations have complete and exclusive sovereignty over their national 
airspace (see paragraphs 1.8 and 2.5.1). With the exception of overflight in transit 
passage ofintemational straits and in archipelagic sea lanes passage (see paragraphs 
2.3.3 and 2.3.4.1), distress (see paragraph 3.2.2.1), and assistance entry to assist 
those in danger of being lost at sea (see paragraph 2.3.2.5), authorization must be 
obtained for any intrusion by a foreign aircraft (military or civil) into national 
airspace (see paragraph 2.5). That authorization may be flight specific, as in the 
case of diplomatic clearance for the visit of a military aircraft, or general, as in the 
case of commercial air navigation pursuant to the Chicago Convention. 
Customary international law provides that a foreign aircraft entering national 
airspace without permission due to distress or navigational error may be required 
to comply with orders to tum back or to land. In this connection the Chicago 
Convention has been amended to provide, in effect: 
1. That all nations must refrain from the use of weapons against civil aircraft, and, 
in the case of the interception of intruding civil aircraft, that the lives of persons on 
board and the safety of the aircraft must not be endangered. (This provision does 
not, however, detract from the right of self-defense recognized under Article 51 of 
the United Nations Charter.) 
2. That all nations have the right to require intruding aircraft to land at some 
designated airfield and to resort to appropriate means consistent with international 
35.( ... continued) 
Management Tools for Crisis, Rand Note N-2963-CC (July 1989). See also Fleck, Rules of 
Engagement for Maritime Forces and the Limitations of the Use of Force under the UN Charter, 
31 Ger. Y.B. Int'l L. 165 (1988). 
36. Contact with a foreign force committing a hostile act or armed attack or displaying hostile 
intent or threat of armed attack against the United States, its forces, a U.S. flag vessel, U.S. citizens 
or their property must be reported immediately by the fastest possible means to ]CS, CNO/CMC, 
and the appropriate unified and component commanders (OPREP-1). Where circumstances 
permit, guidance as to the use of armed force in defense should be sought. However, where the 
circumstances are such that it is impractical to await such guidance, it is the responsibility of the 
on-scene commander to take such measures of self-defense to protect his force as are necessary and 
proportional, consistent with applicable rules of engagement (see paragraph 4.3.2 (p. 259) and 
Annex A 4-3 (p. 277». 
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law to require intruding aircraft to desist from activities in violation of the 
Convention. 
3. That all intruding civil aircraft must comply with the orders given to them and 
that all nations must enact national laws making such compliance by their civil 
aircraft mandatory. 
4. That all nations shall prohibit the deliberate use of their civil aircraft for purposes 
(such as intelligence collection) inconsistent with the Convention.37 
The amendment was approved unanimously on 10 May 1984 and will come 
into force upon ratification bl102 of ICAO's members in respect of those 
nations which have ratified it. 3 The Convention, by its terms, does not apply to 
intruding military aircraft. The U.S. takes the position that customary 
international law establishes similar standards of reasonableness and 
proportionality with respect to a nation's response to military aircraft that stray 
into national airspace through navigational error or that are in distress39 
37. Protocol relating to an amendment to the Convention on International Civil Aviation 
[Art. 3 his], Montreal, 10 May 1984, reprinted in 23 Int'l Legal Mat'Is 705 (1984). 
Para. 8.1 of Attachment A - Interception of Civil Aircraft - to Annex 2 - Rules of the Air - to the 
Chicago Convention provides: "The use of tracer bullets to attract attention is hazardous, and it is 
expected that measures will be taken to avoid their use so that the lives of persons on board and the 
safety of aircraft will not be endangered." 
Documentation regarding the shooting down ofKAL 007 is reproduced in 22 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 
FitzGerald, The Use of Force against Civil Aircraft: The Aftermath of the KAL Flight 007 
Incident, 22 Can. Y.B. Int'l L. 1984, at 291,309. 
38. As of 4 November 1997, 90 nations have ratified the Protocol, including the United 
Kingdom and the Russian Federation. See Table A4-1 (p. 4-33). The Protocol has not been 
submitted to the Senate for advice and consent because of concerns about I.Cl compulsory 
jurisdiction. 
39. AFP 110-31, para. 2-5d, at 2-6; 9 Whiteman 328. On aerial intrusions, see Hughes, Aerial 
Intrusions by Civil Airliners and the Use of Force, 45 J. Air L. & Com. 595 (1980); Hassan, A Legal 
Analysis of the Shooting of Korean Airlines Flight 007 by the Soviet Union, 49 J. Air L. & Com. 
553 (1984); Laveson, Korean Airline Flight 007: Stalemate in International Aviation Law-A 
Proposal for Enforcement, 22 San Diego L. Rev. 859 (1985); Phelps, Aerial Intrusions by Civil and 
Military Aircraft in Time of Peace, 107 Mil. L. Rev. 255 (1985) and Schmitt, Aerial Blockades in 
Historical, Legal and Practical Perspective, 2 U.S.A.F.A. J. Leg. Studies 21 (1991). See also the 
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention ofDangerous Military Activities, Moscow, 
12 June 1989, reprinted in 28 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 879 (1989). 
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ANNEXA4-1 
UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS 
Indonesia - United Nations Consular Commission (CC) 1947-1948. 
* Middle East - United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) 
Jun 1948-date. 
Greece - United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) 
1948. 
* India/Pakistan - United Nations Military Observer Group in India & 
Pakistan (ONMOGIP) Jan 1949-date. 
Korea - United Nations Command (ONC) 1950-1953. 
Suez - United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) 1955-1967. 
Middle East - First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEFI) Nov 
1956-Jun 1967. 
Lebanon - United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)Jun 
1958-Dec 1958. 
Congo - United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC) Jul1960-Jun 
1964. 
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West New Guinea - United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea 
(West Irian) (UNSF) Oct 1962-Apr 1963. 
Yemen - United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) Jul 
1963-Sep 1964. 
* Cyprus - United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 
Mar 1964-date. 
Dominican Republic - Mission of the Representative of the 
Secretary-General In the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) May 
1965-0ct 1966. 
India/Pakistan - United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission 
(UNIPOM) Sep 1965-Mar 1966. 
Middle East - Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) Oct 
1973-JuI1979. 
* Golan Heights - United Nations Disengagement Observer Force 
(UNDOF) Jun 1974-date. 
* Lebanon - United Nations Interior Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Mar 
1978-date. 
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Mghanistan/Pakistan - United Nations Good Offices Mission in Mghanistan 
& Pakistan (UNGOMAP) Apr 1988-Mar 1990. 
Iran/Iraq - United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) 
(Aug 88-Feb 91. 
Angola - United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I) Jan 
89-Jun 91. 
Namibia - United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNT AG) Apr 
1989-Mar 1990. 
Central America - United Nations Observer Group in Central America 
(ONUCA) Nov 1989-Jan 1992. 
* Iraq/Kuwait - United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission 
(UNIKOM) Apr 1991-date. 
Angola - United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNA VEM II) J un 
1991-Feb 1995. 
El Salvador - United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) Jul 
1991-Apr 1995. 
* Western Sahara - United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western 
Sahara (MINURSO) Sep 1991-date. 
Cambodia - United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) Oct 
1991-Mar 1992. 
Cambodia - United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) 
Mar 1992-Sep 1993. 
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Fonner-Yugoslavia - United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Mar 
1992-Dec 1995. 
Somalia - United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) Apr 
1972-Mar 1993. 
Mozambique - United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) 
Dec 1992-Dec 1994. 
Somalia - United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) Mar 
1993-Mar 1995. 
Rwanda/Uganda - United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda 
(UNOMUR) Jun 1993-Sep 1994. 
* Georgia - United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) Aug 
1993-date. 
Haiti - United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) Sep 1993-Jun 1996. 
* Liberia - United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) Sep 
1993-date. 
Rwanda - United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) Oct 
1993-Mar 1996. 
Chad/Libya - United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG) 
May-Jun 1994. 
* Tajikistan - United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) 
Dec 1994-date. 
Safeguarding of U.S. National Interests 271 
* Angola - United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNA VEM III) 
Feb 1995-date. 
Croatia - United Nations Confidence Restoration Organization in Croatia 
(UNCRO) Mar 1995-Jan 1996. 
* Former-Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia - United Nations Preventive 
Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) Mar 1995-date. 
* Bosnia & Herzegovina - United Nations Mission 10 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (UNMIBH) Dec 1995-date. 
* Croatia - United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) Jan 
1996-date. 
* Croatia - United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slovenia, 
Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) Jan 1996-date. 
* Haiti - United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) JuI 
1996-date. 
NOTE: * Indicates an on-going operation as of 1 January 1997. 
Source: U.N. Dep't of Public Information. 
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ANNEXA4-2 
PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF 
INSTRUCTION 
FM SECSTATE WASHDC 
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS 
SPECIAL EMBASSY PROGRAM 
BT 
UNCLAS STATE 265203 
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT CLINTON'S LETTER OF INSTRUCTION TO 
UNITED STATES CHIEFS OF MISSION 
1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS THE TEXT OF PRESIDENT 
CLINTON'S LETTER OF INSTRUCTION TO UNITED STATES 
CHIEFS OF MISSION (COMS), WHICH HE SIGNED ON SEPTEMBER 
16. PLEASE SHARE IT WITH ALL MEMBERS OF YOUR MISSION. 
YOU MAY EXPECT TO RECEIVE YOUR INDIVIDUAL, SIGNED 
LETTER BY POUCH IN THE NEXT MONTH OR SO. QUESTIONS 
OR COMMENTS ON THE LETTER MAY BE ADDRESSED TO THE 
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT POLICY (FMPI MP), ROOM 7427NS, 
202-647-7789. 
2. BEGIN TEXT. 
DEAR MR.lMADAM AMBASSADOR: 
A) PLEASE ACCEPT MY BEST WISHES AND APPRECIATION FOR 
YOUR EFFORTS AS MY PERSONAL REf'KESE('J1'A'h'{~ rru 
(COUNTRY IINTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION). 
B)WEAREATAMOMENTOFUNIQUEHISTORICOPPORTUNITY 
FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR THE WORLD. WITH THE 
END OF THE COLD WAR, WE ARE ENTERING AN ERA SO NEW 
THAT IT HAS YET TO ACQUIRE A NAME. OUR TASK AS A NA-
TION, AND YOURS AS CHIEF OF THE UNITED STATES MISSION, IS 
TO ENSURE THAT THIS NEW ERA IS ONE CONDUCIVE TO 
AMERICAN PROSPERITY, TO AMERICAN SECURITY, AND TO 
THE VALUES AMERICA SEEKS TO EXEMPLIFY. TO ACCOMPLISH 
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THIS TASK I NEED YOUR FULL SUPPORT FOR THE THREE GOALS 
OF MY FOREIGN POLICY THAT AIM TO KEEP OUR NATION 
STRONG AT HOME AND ABROAD: RENEWING AND ADAPTING 
AMERICA'S SECURITY ALLIANCES AND STRUCTURES; RE-
BUILDING AND REVITALIZING THE AMERICAN ECONOMY; 
AND PROMOTING DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT. 
C) YOU SHOULD GIVE SPECIAL ATTENTION IN THE SECURITY 
REALM TO HALTING ARMS PROLIFERATION, PREVENTING, 
RESOLVING, AND CONTAINING CONFLICT, AND TO COUNTER-
ING TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL CRIME; AND IN THE 
ECONOMIC ARENA, TO OPENING AND EXPANDING MARKETS 
FOR AMERICA'S EXPORTS. NO COUNTRY CAN BE EXEMPT 
FROM UPHOLDING THE BASIC PRINCIPLES IN THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS; ALL SHOULD UNDER-
STAND THAT SHARED DEMOCRATIC VALUES ARE THE MOST 
RELIABLE FOUNDATION FOR GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE 
UNITED STATES. FINALLY, I WILL NEED YOUR HELP AS MY 
ADMINISTRATION SEEKS TO PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION TO ADDRESS GLOBAL PROBLEMS INCLUDING 
THE ENVIRONMENT AND POPULATION, NARCOTICS PRODUC-
TION AND TRAFFICKING, REFUGEES, MIGRATION, AND 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. 
D) ACHIEVING THESE GOALS WILL DEMAND A DYNAMIC 
DIPLOMACY THAT HARNESSES CHANGE IN THE SERVICE OF 
OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS AND VALUES. IT WILL REQUIRE US 
TO MEET THREATS TO OUR SECURITY AND PRACTICE 
PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY, AND TO ANTICIPATE THREATS TO 
OUR INTERESTS AND TO PEACE IN THE WORLD BEFORE THEY 
BECOME CRISES AND DRAIN OUR HUMAN AND MATERIAL 
RESOURCES IN WASTEFUL WAYS. I HAVE ASKED YOU TO 
REPRESENT THE UNITED STATES IN (COUNTRY)/AT (INTER-
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION) BECAUSE I AM CONFIDENT THAT 
YOU POSSESS THE SKILLS, DEDICATION, AND EXPERIENCE 
NECESSARY TO MEET THE MANY CHALLENGES THAT THIS NEW 
AND COMPLEX ERA PRESENTS. THIS LETTER OUTLINES YOUR 
PRINCIPAL AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES. I HAVE 
INFORMED ALL DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY HEADS OF THESE 
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INSTRUCTIONS, AND I KNOW YOU WILL RECEIVE THEIR FULL 
SUPPORT. 
E) I CHARGE YOU TO EXERCISE YOUR AUTHORITY WITH 
WISDOM, JUSTICE, AND IMAGINATION. DRAMATIC CHANGE 
ABROAD AND AUSTERITY HERE AT HOME HAVE PUT A 
PREMIUM ON LEADERSHIP AND TEAMWORK. CAREFUL STEW-
ARDSHIP OF YOUR MISSION'S RESOURCES STANDS IN THE 
FOREFRONT OF YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES. I URGE YOU TO SEE 
BUDGETARY STRINGENCY NOT AS A HARDSHIP TO BE 
ENDURED BUT AS AN INCENTIVE TO INNOVATION. 
F) AS MY REPRESENTATIVE, YOU, WITH THE SECRETARY OF 
STATE, ASSIST ME IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MY CONSTITU-
TIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE CONDUCT OF OUR 
RELATIONS WITH (COUNTRY/INTERNATIONAL ORGAN-
IZATION). I CHARGE YOU TO EXERCISE FULL RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR THE DIRECTION, COORDINATION, AND SUPERVISION OF 
ALL EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICES AND PERSONNEL IN 
(COUNTRY)/AT (INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION), EXCEPT 
FOR PERSONNEL UNDER THE COMMAND OF A U.S. AREA 
MILITARY COMMANDER, UNDER ANOTHER CHIEF OF MISSION 
IN (COUNTRY) OR ON THE STAFF OF AN INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION. THIS ENCOMPASSES ALL AMERICAN AND 
FOREIGN NATIONAL PERSONNEL, IN ALL EMPLOYMENT 
CATEGORIES, WHETHER DIRECT HIRE OR CONTRACT, FULL-
OR PART -TIME, PERMANENT OR TEMPORARY. 
G) ALL EXECUTIVE BRANCH PERSONNEL UNDER YOUR 
AUTHORITY MUST KEEP YOU FULLY INFORMED AT ALL TIMES 
OF THEIR CURRENT AND PLANNED ACTIVITIES, SO THAT YOU 
CAN EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT YOUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
U.S. GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS AND OPERATIONS. YOU HA VB 
THE RIGHT TO SEE ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO OR FROM 
MISSION ELEMENTS, HOWEVER TRANSMITTED, EXCEPT THOSE 
SPECIFICALLY EXEMPTED BY LAW OR EXECUTIVE DECISION. 
H) AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF, I RETAIN AUTHORITY OVER U.S. 
ARMED FORCES. ON MY BEHALF YOU HAVE RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR THE DIRECTION, COORDINATION, SUPERVISION, AND 
SAFETY, INCLUDING SECURITY FROM TERRORISM, OF ALL 
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DEPARTl\tlENT OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL ON OFFICIAL DUTY (IN 
(COUNTRY)/ AT (INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION), EXCEPT 
THOSE PERSONNEL UNDER THE COMMAND OF A U.S. AREA 
MILITARY COMMANDER. YOU AND SUCH COMMANDERS 
MUST KEEP EACH OTHER CURRENTLY INFORMED AND 
COOPERATE ON ALL MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. ANY 
DIFFERENCES THAT CANNOT BE RESOLVED IN THE FIELD 
SHOULD BE REPORTED BY YOU TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE; 
AREA MILITARY COMMANDERS SHOULD REPORT TO THE 
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. 
I) EVERY EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCY UNDER YOUR 
AUTHORITY, INCLUDING THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, MUST 
OBTAIN YOUR APPROVAL TO CHANGE THE SIZE, COMPOSI-
TION, OR MANDATE OF ITS STAFF. USE THIS AUTHORITY TO 
RESHAPE YOUR MISSION IN WAYS THAT DIRECTLY SERVE 
AMERICAN INTERESTS AND VALUES .... 
j) THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS MY PRINCIPAL FOREIGN POLICY 
ADVISER. UNDER MY DIRECTION, HE IS, TO THE FULLEST 
EXTENT PROVIDED BY THE LAW, RESPONSmLE FOR THE 
OVERALL COORDINATION AND SUPERVISION OF U.S. GOV-
ERNMENT ACTIVITIES ABROAD. THE ONLY AUTHORIZED 
CHANNEL FOR INSTRUCTIONS TO YOU IS THROUGH HIM OR 
FROMME .... 
K) THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND, BY EXTENSION, CHIEFS OF 
MISSION ABROAD MUST PROTECT ALL U.S. GOVERNMENT 
PERSONNEL ON OFFICIAL DUTY ABROAD (OTHER THAN 
THOSE PERSONNEL UNDER THE COMMAND OF A U.S. AREA 
MILITARY COMMANDER) AND THEIR ACCOMPANYING DE-
PENDENTS. I EXPECT YOU TO TAKE DIRECT RESPONSmILITY 
FOR THE SECURITY OF YOUR MISSION. I ALSO EXPECT YOU TO 
SUPPORT STRONGLY APPROPRIATE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
AND COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIVITIES THAT ENHANCE 
SECURITY BOTH LOCALLY AND IN THE BROADER INTERNA-
TIONAL CONTEXT. 
L) YOU SHOULD COOPERATE FULLY WITH PERSONNEL OF THE 
U.S. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES IN (COUNTRY)/AT 
(INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION) SO THAT U.S. FOREIGN 
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POLICY GOALS ARE ADVANCED, SECURITY IS MAINTAINED 
AND EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE, AND JUDICIAL RESPONSIDILI-
TIES ARE CARRIED OUT. 
M) AS CHIEF OF MISSION YOU ARE NOT ONLY MY 
REPRESENTATIVE IN (COUNTRY/INTERNATIONAL ORGANI-
ZATION) BUT A SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE OF OUR NATION. 
THIS IS BOTH A HIGH HONOR AND A GREAT RESPONSIDILITY. I 
EXPECT YOU TO DISCHARGE THIS TRUST WITH PROFESSIONAL 
EXCELLENCE, THE HIGHEST STANDARDS OF ETHICAL 
CONDUCT, AND DIPLOMATIC DISCRETION .... 
N) ALWAYS KEEP IN MIND THAT, FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND 
PEOPLE OF (COUNTRY)/THE SECRETARIAT AND OTHER 
REPRESENTATIVES TO (INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION), 
YOU AND YOUR MISSION SYMBOLIZE THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA AND ITS VALUES. NEVER FORGET THE SOLEMN DUTY 
THAT WE, AS PUBLIC SERVANTS, OWE TO THE CITIZENS OF 
AMERICA-THE ACTIVE PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF 
THEIR WELL-BEING, SAFETY, AND IDEALS. THERE IS NO BETTER 
DEFINITION OF AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST AND NO 
LOFTIER OBJECT FOR OUR EFFORTS. 
SINCERELY, 
(SIGNED) 
BILL CLINTON 
END TEXT. 
BT 
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ANNEXA4-3 
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 
(SROE) 
[NOTE: This annex is a reprint of Enclosure A, Chainnan, ]CS Instruction 
3121.01 (1 Oct 94), which is the unclassified portion of that instruction. Within 
Enclosure A, there are references to its Appendix A as well as to Enclosures Band 
C and the Glossary of the C]SC instruction. However, those referenced 
documents are classified and are not reproduced here.] 
STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR US FORCES 
1. Purpose and Scope. 
a. The purpose of these SROE is to provide implementation guidance on 
the inherent right and obligation of self-defense and the application of force for 
mission accomplishment. The SROE establish fundamental policies and 
procedures governing the actions to be taken by U.S. force commanders during 
all military operations, contingencies, or prolonged conflicts. In order to provide 
unifonn training and planning capabilities, this document is authorized for 
distribution to commanders at all levels to be used as fundamental guidance for 
training and directing their forces. 
b. Except as augmented by supplemental rules of engagement for specific 
operations, missions, or projects, the policies and procedures established herein 
remain in effect until rescinded. 
c. U.S. forces operating with multinational forces: 
(1) U.S. forces assigned to the operational control (OPCON) of a 
multinational force will follow the ROE of the multinational force unless 
otherwise directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA). U.S. forces 
will be assigned and remain OPCON to a multinational force only if the 
combatant commander and higher authority determine that the ROE for that 
multinational force are consistent with the policy guidance on unit self-defense 
and with the rules for individual self-defense contained in this document. 
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(2) When U.S. forces, under U.S. OPCON, operate in conjunction 
with a multinational force, reasonable efforts will be made to effect common 
ROE. If such ROE cannot be established, U.S. forces will exercise the right and 
obligation of self-defense contained in this document while seeking guidance 
from the appropriate combatant command. To avoid mutual interference, the 
multinational forces will be informed prior to U.S. participation in the operation 
of the U.S. forces' intentions to operate under these SROE and to exercise unit 
self-defense. For additional guidance concerning peace operations, see 
Appendix A to Enclosure A. 
(3) Participation in multinational operations may be complicated by 
varying national obligations derived from international agreements, i.e., other 
members in a coalition may not be signatories to treaties that bind the United 
States, or they may be bound by treaties to which the United States is not a party. 
U.S. forces still remain bound by U.S. treaty obligations even if the other 
members in a coalition are not signatories to a treaty and need not adhere to its 
terms. 
d. Commanders of U.S. forces subject to international agreements 
governing their presence in foreign countries (e.g., Status of Forces Agreements) 
are not relieved of the inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary 
means available and to take all appropriate action for unit self-defense. 
e. U.S. forces in support of operations not under operational or tactical 
control of a combatant commander or performing missions under direct control 
of the NCA, Military Departments, or other U.S. government 
departments/agencies (i.e., marine security guards, certain special security 
forces) will operate under use-of-force or ROE promulgated by those 
departments or agencies. 
£ U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) units and units under USCG OPCON 
conducting law enforcement operations, and USCG personnel using their law 
enforcement authority, will follow the use-of-force policy issued by the 
Commandant, USCG. Nothing in the USCG use-of-force policy negates a 
commander's inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means 
available and to take all appropriate action for unit self-defense in accordance 
with these SROE. 
g. The guidance in this document does not cover U.S. forces deployed to 
assist federal and local authorities during times of civil disturbance within the 
territorial jurisdiction of any state, the District of Columbia, Commonwealths of 
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Puerto Rico and the Northern Marianas, U.S. possessions, and U.S. territories. 
Forces in these situations will follow use-of-force policy found in DOD Civil 
Disturbance Plan, "Garden Plot" (Appendix 1 to Annex C of Garden Plot). 
h. U.S. forces deployed to assist foreign, federal, and local authorities in 
disaster assistance missions, such as earthquakes and hurricanes, will follow 
use-of-force guidelines as set forth in the mission's execute order and subsequent 
orders. 
i. U.S. forces will always comply with the Law of Armed Conflict. 
However, not all situations involving the use of force are armed conflicts under 
international law. Those approving operational rules of engagement must 
determine if the internationally recognized Law of Armed Conflict applies. In 
those circumstances when armed conflict, under international law, does not 
exist, Law of Armed Conflict principles may, nevertheless, be applied as a matter 
of national policy. If armed conflict occurs, the actions of U.S. forces will be 
governed by both the Law of Armed Conflict and rules of engagement. 
2. Policy. 
a. THESE RULES DO NOT LIMIT A COMMANDER'S INHER-
ENT AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION TO USE ALL NECESSARY 
MEANS AVAILABLE AND TO TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE ACTION IN 
SELF-DEFENSE OF THE COMMANDER'S UNIT AND OTHER U.S. 
FORCES IN THE VICINITY. 
b. U.S. national security policy serves to protect the United States, U.S. 
forces, and, in certain circumstances, U.S. citizens and their property, U.S. 
commercial assets, and other designated non-U.S. forces, foreign nationals, and 
their property from hostile attack. U.S. national security policy is guided, in part, 
by the need to maintain a stable international environment compatible with U.S. 
national security interests. In addition, U.S. national security interests guide our 
global objectives of deterring armed attack against the United States across the 
range of military operations, defeating an attack should deterrence fail, and 
preventing or neutralizing hostile efforts to intimidate or coerce the United 
States by the threat or use of armed force or terrorist actions. Deterrence requires 
clear and evident capability and resolve to fight at any level of conflict and, if 
necessary, to increase deterrent force capabilities and posture deliberately so that 
any potential aggressor will assess its own risks as unacceptable. U.S. policy, 
should deterrence fail, provides flexibility to respond to crises with options that: 
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(1) Are proportional to the provocation. 
(2) Are designed to limit the scope and intensity of the conflict. 
(3) Will discourage escalation. 
(4) Will achieve political and military objectives. 
3. Intent. These SROE are intended to: 
a. Provide general guidelines on self-defense and are applicable worldwide 
to all echelons of command. 
b. Provide guidance governing the use of force consistent with mission 
accomplishment. 
c. Be used in operations other than war, during transition from peacetime 
to armed conflict or war, ~nd during armed conflict in the absence of superseding 
guidance. 
4. Combatant Commanders' SROE. 
a. Combatant commanders may augment these SROE as necessary to 
reflect changing political and military policies, threats, and missions specific to 
their AOR. When specific standing rules governing the use of force in a 
combatant commander's AOR are required that are different from these SROE, 
they will be submitted to the Chairman of the Joint ChiefS of Staff for NCA 
approval as necessary and promulgated by the Joint Staff as an Annex to 
Enclosure C of these SROE. 
b. Combatant commanders will distribute these SROE to subordinate 
commanders and units for compliance. The mechanism for disseminating ROE 
supplemental measures is set forth in Enclosure B. 
5. Definitions. 
a. Inherent R~ht if Self-Deftnse. A commander has the authority and 
obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action to 
defend that commander's unit and other U.S. forces in the vicinity from a hostile 
act or demonstrated hostile intent. Neither these rules nor the supplemental 
measures activated to augment these rules limit this inherent right and 
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obligation. At all times, however, the requirements of necessity and 
proportionality as amplified in these SROE will be the basis for the judgment of 
the commander as to what constitutes an appropriate response to a particular 
hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent. 
b. National Self-Dqense. National self-defense is the act of defending the 
United States, U.S. forces, and, in certain circumstances, U.S. citizens and their 
property, U.S. commercial assets, and other designated non-U.S. forces, foreign 
nationals and their property, from a hostile act or hostile intent. Once a force or 
terrorist unit is declared hostile by appropriate authority exercising the right and 
obligation of national self-defense (see paragraph 2 of Appendix A to Enclosure 
A), individual U.S. units do not need to observe a hostile act or determine hostile 
intent before engaging that force. 
NOTE: Collective Self-Difense, as a subset of national self-defense, is the act of 
defending other designated non-U.S. forces, personnel and their property from a 
hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent. Only the NCA may authorize U.S. 
forces to exercise collective self-defense. 
c. Unit Self-Dqense. Unit self-defense is the act of defending a particular 
unit of U.S. forces, including elements or personnel thereof, and other U.S. 
forces in the vicinity, against a hostile act or hostile intent. The need to exercise 
unit self-defense may arise in many situations such as localized low-level 
conflicts, humanitarian efforts, peace enforcement actions, terrorist response, or 
prolonged engagements. Individual self-defense is a subset of unit self-defense: 
see the Glossary for a definition of individual self-defense. 
d. Elements of Self-Dqense. The application of armed force in self-defense 
requires the following two elements: 
(1) Necessity. A hostile act occurs or a force or terrorist unit exhibits 
hostile intent. 
(2) Proportionality. The force used must be reasonable in intensity, 
duration, and magnitude, based on all facts known to the commander at the time, 
to decisively counter the hostile act or hostile intent and to ensure the continued 
safety of U.S. forces. 
e. Hostile Act. A hostile act is an attack or other use of force by a foreign 
force or terrorist unit (organization or individual) against the United States, U.S. 
forces, and in certain circumstance, U.S. citizens, their property, U.S. 
commercial assets, and other designated non-U.S. forces, foreign nationals and 
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their property. It is also force used directly to preclude or impede the mission 
and/ or duties ofU .S. forces, including the recovery ofU .S. personnel and U.S. 
government property. When a hostile act is in progress, the right exists to use 
proportional force, including armed force, in self-defense by all necessary means 
available to deter or neutralize the potential attacker or, if necessary, to destroy 
the threat. (See definitions in the Glossary for amplification.) 
£ Hostile Intent. Hostile intent is the threat of imminent use of force by a 
foreign force or terrorist unit (organization or individual) against the United 
States, U.S. forces, and in certain circumstances, U.S. citizens, their property, 
U.S. commercial assets, or other designated non-U.S. forces, foreign nationals 
and their property. When hostile intent is present, the right exists to use 
proportional force, including armed force, in self-defense by all necessary means 
available to deter or neutralize the potential attacker or, if necessary, to destroy 
the threat. (See definitions in the Glossary for amplification.) 
g. Hostile Force. Any force or terrorist unit (civilian, paramilitary, or 
military), with or without national designation, that has committed a hostile act, 
demonstrated hostile intent, or has been declared hostile. 
6. Declarin~ Force Hostile. Once a force is declared hostile by appropriate 
authority, U.S. units need not observe a hostile act or a demonstration of hostile 
intent before engaging that force. The responsibility for exercising the right and 
obligation of national self-defense and declaring a force hostile is a matter of the 
utmost importance demanding considerable judgement of command. All 
available intelligence, the status of international relationships, the requirements 
of international law, the possible need for a political decision, and the potential 
consequences for the United States must be carefully weighed. Exercising the 
right and obligation of national self-defense by competent authority is in 
addition to and does not supplant the right and obligation to exercise unit 
self-defense. The authority to declare a force hostile is limited as amplified in 
Appendix A to Enclosure A. 
7. Authority to Exercise Self-Deftnse. 
a. National Self-Deftnse. The authority to exercise national self-defense is 
outlined in Appendix A to Enclosure A. 
b. Collective Self-Deftnse. Only the NCA may authorize the exerCIse of 
collective self-defense. 
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c. Unit Self-Difense. A unit conunander has the authority and obligation to 
use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action to defend the 
unit, including elements and personnel thereof, or other u.s. forces in the 
vicinity, against a hostile act or hostile intent. In defending against a hostile act or 
hostile intent under these SROE, unit commanders should use only that degree 
of force necessary to decisively counter the hostile intent and to ensure the 
continued safety of U.S. forces. 
8. Action in Self-Difense. 
a. Means of Self-Difense. All necessary means available and all appropriate 
actions may be used in self-defense. The following guidelines apply for unit or 
national self-defense: 
(1) Attempt to Control Without the Use of Force. The use of force is 
normally a measure of last resort. When time and circumstances permit, the 
potentially hostile force should be warned and given the opportunity to 
withdraw or cease threatening actions. (See Appendix A to Enclosure A for 
amplification. ) 
(2) Use Proportional Force to Control the Situation. When the use of force 
in self-defense is necessary, the nature, duration, and scope of the engagement 
should not exceed that which is required to decisively counter the hostile act or 
hostile intent and to ensure the continued safety ofU .S. forces or other protected 
personnel or property. 
(3) Attack to Disable or Destroy. An attack to disable or destroy a hostile 
force is authorized when such action is the only prudent means which a hostile 
act or hostile intent can be prevented or terminated. When such conditions exist, 
engagement is authorized only until the hostile force no longer poses an 
imminent threat. 
b. Immediate Pursuit of Hostile Foreign Forces. In self-defense, U.S. forces may 
pursue and engage a hostile force that has committed a hostile act or 
demonstrated hostile intent and that remains an imminent threat. (See Appendix 
A to Enclosure A for amplification.) 
c. Difending U.S. Citizens, Property, and Designated Foreign Nationals. 
(1) Within a Foreign Nation's U.S. Recognized Territory or Territorial 
Airspace. A foreign nation has the principal responsibility for defending U.S. 
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citizens and property within these areas. (See Appendix A to Enclosure A for 
amplification. ) 
(2) At Sea. Detailed guidance is contained in Annex A to Appendix B of 
this enclosure. 
(3) In International Airspace. Protecting civil aircraft in international 
airspace is principally the responsibility of the nation of registry. Guidance for 
certain cases of actual or suspected hijacking of airborne U.S. or foreign civil 
aircraft is contained in MCM-102-92, 24July 1992, Hijacking of Civil Aircraft. 
(4) Terrorism. Terrorist attacks are usually undertaken by civilian or 
paramilitary organizations, or by individuals under circumstances in which a 
determination of hostile intent may be difficult. The definitions of hostile act and 
hostile intent set forth above will be used in situations where terrorist attacks are 
likely. The term "hostile force" includes terrorist units when used in this 
document. When circumstances and intelligence dictate, supplemental ROE 
will be used to meet this special threat. 
(5) Piracy. Piracy is defined as an illegal act of violence, depredation 
(i.e., plundering, robbing, or pillaging), or detention in or over international 
waters committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or 
aircraft against another ship or aircraft or against persons or property on board 
such ship or aircraft. U.S. warships and aircraft have an obligation to repress 
piracy on or over international waters directed against any vessel, or aircraft, 
whether U.S. or foreign flagged. If a pirate vessel or aircraft fleeing from pursuit 
proceeds into the territorial sea, archipelagic waters, or supeJjacent airspace of 
another country every effort should be made to obtain the consent of nation 
sovereignty to continue pursuit. Where circumstances permit, commanders will 
seek guidance from higher authority before using armed force to repress an act of 
pIracy. 
d. Operations Within or in the Vicinity of Hostile Fire or Combat Zones Not 
Involvinf!. the United States. 
(1) U.S. forces should not enter, or remain in, a zone in which 
hostilities (not involving the United States) are imminent or occurring between 
foreign forces unless directed by proper authority. 
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(2) If a force commits a hostile act or demonstrates hostile intent against 
U.S. forces in a hostile fire or combat zone, the commander is obligated to act in 
unit self-defense in accordance with SROE guidelines. 
e. Right if Assistance Entry. 
(1) Ships, or under certain circumstances aircraft, have the right to 
enter a foreign territorial sea or archipelagic waters and corresponding airspace 
without the permission of the coastal or island state to engage in legitimate efforts 
to render emergency assistance to those in danger or distress from perils of the 
sea. 
(2) Right of assistance extends only to rescues where the location of 
those in danger is reasonably well known. It does not extend to entering the 
territorial sea, archipelagic waters, or national airspace to conduct a search. 
(3) For ships and aircraft rendering assistance on scene, the right and 
obligation of self-defense extends to and includes persons, vessels, or aircraft 
being assisted. The right of self-defense in such circumstances does not include 
interference with legitimate law enforcement actions of a coastal nation. 
However, once received on board the assisting ship or aircraft, persons assisted 
will not be surrendered to foreign authority unless directed by the NCA. 
(4) Further guidance for the exercise of the right of assistance entry is 
contained in C]CS Instruction 2410.01, 20 July 1993, "Guidance for the 
Exercise of Right of Assistance Entry." 
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TABLEA4-1 
STATES wmCH HAVE RATIFIED 
THE PROTOCOL RELATING TO AN AMENDMENT TO THE 
CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION 
ARTICLE 3 bis, SIGNED AT MONTREAL ON 10 MAY 1984 
(As of 4 November 1997) 
Barbados 23 Nov 1984 Niger 8 Apr 1988 
Chile 26 Nov 1984 Ecuador 22 Apr 1988 
Austria 11 Jan 1985 Guyana 2 May 1988 
Oman 21 Feb 1985 Antigua and Barbuda 17 Oct 1988 
Republic of Korea 27 Feb 1985 Gabon 1 Nov 1988 
Tunisia 29 Apr 1985 Colombia 10 Mar 1989 
Senegal 2 May 1985 Cyprus 5Jul1989 
Luxembourg 10May1985 Mauritius 7 Nov 1989 
Ethiopia 22 May 1985 Bahrain 7 Feb 1990 
Pakistan 10Jun 1985 Hungary 24 May 1990 
South Africa 28 Jun 1985 Mexico 20Jun 1990 
Togo 5 Jul1985 Morocco 19 Jul1990 
Nigeria 8Jul1985 Russian Federation 24 Aug 1990 
Thailand 12Jul1985 Ireland 19 Sep 1990 
Egypt 1 Aug 1985 Qatar 23 Oct 1990 
Seychelles 8 Aug 1985 Malawi 13 Dec 1990 
France 19 Aug 1985 Portugal 17 Jun 1991 
Belgium 20 Sep 1985 Burundi 10 Oct 1991 
Denmark 16 Oct 1985 Finland 18 Dec 1991 
Norway 16 Oct 1985 Estonia 21 Aug 1992 
Sweden 16 Oct 1985 Fiji 21 Sep 1992 
Spain 24 Oct 1985 Papua New Guinea 5 Oct 1992 
Switzerland 24 Feb 1986 Monaco 27 Jan 1993 
Bangladesh 3 Jun 1986 Turkmenistan 14 Apr 1993 
Italy 12Jun 1986 Czech Republic 15 Apr 1993 
Kuwait 18Jul1986 Uzbekistan 24 Feb 1994 
Saudi Arabia 21 Jul1986 Malta 25 Mar 1994 
Australia 10Sep 1986 Croatia 6 May 1994 
Madagascar 10 Sep 1986 Eritrea 27 May 1994 
Canada 23 Sep 1986 Iran 17 Jun 1994 
Jordan 8 Oct 1986 Lebanon 14 Dec 1994 
Argentina 1 Dec 1986 San Marino 3 Feb 1995 
Netherlands 18 Dec 1986 Slovakia 20 Mar 1995 
Brazil 21 Jan 1987 Uganda 7Jul1995 
United Arab Emirates 18 Feb 1987 Kenya 5 Oct 1995 
Mali 4 Mar 1987 Germany 2Jul1996 
Panama 22 May 1987 Belarus 24 Jul1996 
Cote d'Ivoire 5 Jun 1987 Libya 28 Oct 1996 
United Kingdom 21 Aug 1987 Maldives 8 Apr 1997 
Uruguay 11 Sep 1987 Bosnia & Herzegovina 9 May 1997 
Guatemala 18 Sep 1987 Moldova 20 Jun 1997 
Greece 26 Oct 1987 Ghana 15 Jul1997 
Nepal 26 Oct 1987 China 23Jul1997 
Cameroon 28Jan 1988 Belize 24 Sep 1997 
Lesotho 17 Mar1988 Israel 30 Sep 1997 
Source: International Civil Aviation Organization, Legal Bureau, MontreaL 
